

REFERENCES FOR LECTURE ON  
"IMPACT OF HIGHER ORDER BELIEFS"  
TALK FOR THE 2005 NEMMERS PRIZE CONFERENCE  
STEPHEN MORRIS

## References

- [1] Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (1997). "Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory," *Journal of Logic, Language and Information* **6**, 171-190.
- [2] Morris, S. (2002). "Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic-Mail Game," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* **18**, 433-445.
- [3] Carlsson, H. and van Damme, E. (1993). "Global games and equilibrium selection," *Econometrica* **61**, 989-1018.
- [4] Chaudhuri, A., A. Schotter and B. Sopher (2001). "Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter-Generational Minimum Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice."
- [5] Ely, J. and M. Peski (2004). "Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability," [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=626641](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=626641).
- [6] Heinemann, F., R. Nagel and P. Ockenfels (2004). "The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information," *Econometrica* **72**, 1583-1600.
- [7] Jehiel, P. and F. Koessler (2004). "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-based Expectations."
- [8] Leamer, E (1985). "Vector Autoregressions for Causal Inference?" *Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy* **22**, 255-304.
- [9] Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (1997). "Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory," *Journal of Logic, Language and Information* **6**, 171-190.
- [10] Morris, S. (2002). "Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic-Mail Game," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* **18**, 433-445.
- [11] Morris, S. (2002). "Typical Types," <http://www.econ.yale.edu/%7Eesm326/typical.pdf>.
- [12] Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (1997). "Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory," *Journal of Logic, Language and Information* **6**, 171-190.
- [13] Morris, S. and H. Shin (2003). "Global Games: Theory and Applications", in *Advances in Economics and Econometrics (Proceedings)*

*of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society*), edited by M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen and S. Turnovsky. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

- [14] Rubinstein, A. (1989). "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under Almost Common Knowledge," *American Economic Review* **79**, 385-391.
- [15] Rubinstein (1991). "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," *Econometrica* **59**, 909-924.
- [16] Weinstein, J. and M. Yildiz (2003). "Finite Order Implications of Any Equilibrium," [http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download\\_pdf.php?id=911](http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=911).