Harry PEI

CONTACT INFORMATION	2211 Campus Drive, Office 3391 Evanston, IL, 60208.	Webpage: sites.northwestern.edu/harrypei/ Email: harrydp@northwestern.edu	
RESEARCH Interests	Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Political Economy, Law and Economics.		
Employment	Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Northwestern University Visiting Faculty, Cowles Foundation, Yale University		since 2018 2023-2024
EDUCATION	Massachusetts Institute of Technology, PhD in Economics		2013-2018
	Toulouse School of Economics, MA in Economics		2011-2013
	Tsinghua University, BA in Mathematics		2007-2011
Honors and Awards	NSF CAREER Award SES-2337566 R NSF Grant SES-1947021, Monotone M Northwestern University Career Develo	lethods in Reputations.	2024-2029 2020-2024 2023
	Review of Economic Studies European		2018
	Robert Solow Prize for Excellence in R	<u> </u>	2018
	Best TA of the Year Award, Department		2017
	Ho-Ching and Han-Ching Scholarship,		2016
	Department of Economics Fellowship, Jean-Jacques Laffont Fellowship, Tould		2013-2015 2011-2013
Publication	Robust Implementation with Costly I Economic Studies, forthcoming.	Information, with Bruno Strulovici.	Review of
	Reputation Effects under Short Memories. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , forthcoming, a one-page abstract appears in the Proceedings of EC'23.		
	Repeated Communication with Private Lying Costs. Journal of Economic Theory, 210, 105668, June 2023.		
	Reputation Building under Observational Learning. Review of Economic Studies, $90(3)$, $1441-1469$, May 2023 .		
	A Reputation for Honesty. with Drew Fudenberg and Ying Gao, <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 204, 105508, September 2022.		
	Reputations for Playing Mixed Actions: A Characterization Theorem. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 201, 105438, April 2022.		
	Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment. $Theoretic Economics, 16, 449–475, May 2021.$		
	Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games. with Yingkai Li, Journal of Economic		

Reputation Effects under Interdependent Values. Econometrica, 88(5), 2175-2202, September 2020.

Theory, 193, 105222, April 2021.

Monotone Equilibria in Signaling Games. with Shuo Liu, European Economic Review, 124, 103408, May 2020.

When Does Restricting Your Opponent's Freedom Hurt You? Games and Economic Behavior, 100, 234-239, November 2016.

Communication with Endogenous Information Acquisition. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 160, 132-149, December 2015.

Working Papers Reputation Effects with Endogenous Records.

Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records.

Reputational Bargaining and Inefficient Technology Adoption, with Maren Vairo.

Crime Aggregation, Deterrence, and Witness Credibility, with Bruno Strulovici.

Building Trust in Government: The Opportunities and Challenges of Adverse Shocks, with Avidit Acharya and Edoardo Grillo.

Misspecified Beliefs about Time Lags, with Yingkai Li.

Reputation with Strategic Information Disclosure.

ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE

Reviewer: National Science Foundation, Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Political Economy, American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, AER Insights, AEJ-Micro, AEJ-Policy, Journal of Finance, Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of the European Economic Association, International Economic Review, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Economic Letters, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Journal of Legal Studies.

Program Committee: EC 2024, EC 2023, WINE 2023, WINE 2022.

Seminars: 2023-24 Brown University, Boston University, University of Miami, Yale University, European University Institute, University of Tokyo, Hitosubashi University, National University of Singapore, 2022-23 University of Pennsylvania, New York University, University of Bonn, Bocconi University, Aalto University, University of New South Wales, FGV-EPGE. 2021-22 Columbia University, Stanford GSB, CMU-University of Pittsburgh, HKU-HKUST-CUHK joint theory seminar, UC Riverside, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris Game Theory Seminar, IAE-CSIC and Autonomous University of Barcelona, 2020-21 University of Michigan, UCLA, Aalto University, Bilkent University, Peking University, Seminar in Economic Theory (SET), Virtual Formal Theory Workshop, One World Mathematical Game Theory Seminar. 2019-20 Paris School of Economics, Toulouse School of Economics, Ohio State University, Michigan State University, University of Wisconsin Milwaukee, Ecole Polytechnique, University of Warwick, Singapore Management University, Nanyang Technological University, McMaster University. 2018-19 University of Pennsylvania, Duke University-UNC Chapel Hill, University of Chicago, University of Texas Austin, University of Rochester, University of Carlos III Madrid, CEMFI, MIT Sloan, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Tsinghua University, Peking University, Paris Game Theory Seminar, HEC Paris, University College London, Pennsylvania State University, Western University, University of Toronto, ITAM. 2017-18 Princeton University, Harvard University, Northwestern University, UC Berkeley, Kellogg MEDS,

University of Southern California, Queen Mary University of London, CERGE-EI Prague, University of Copenhagen, ITAM, Durham Business School, University of Warwick.

Conference Talks: AEA-ASSA Meeting (2024, 2022, 2021, 2020, 2015, 2013), Digital Economics Conference in Toulouse (2024), SITE Dynamic Game Session (2023, 2018, 2016), Becker-Friedman Institute Theory Conference (2023), EC Conference (2023), Canadian Economic Theory Conference (2023, 2022, 2020), Workshop in Honour of David Levine (2023), UChicago-Northwestern Theory Conference (2023), ANU Organizational Economics Workshop (2023), Markets, Contracts, and Organizations Workshop (2023), Southern Economic Association Conference (2022), Transatlantic Theory Workshop (2022, 2021, 2019, 2018), Conference for Drew Fudenberg's 65th birthday (2022), KIT-Paris-ZEW Market Design Workshop (2022), 8th Relational Contract Workshop (2022), 6th Bargaining Workshop in Heidelberg (2022), Northwestern-Toulouse IO Conference (2022), Cowles Theory Conference (2021), Theory Conference at Collegio Carlo Alberto (2021), Conference on Network Science (2021), Tsinghua University Alumni Conference (2021), Midwest Theory Conference (2021), SITE Political Economy Session (2020), UC Riverside Theory Workshop (2020), Midwest Economic Theory Conference (2021), SAET Conference (2019), Stony Brooks Game Theory Conference (2019), Arizona State University Theory Conference (2018), Minnesota-Chicago Accounting Theory Conference (2018), Workshop on Communication in Montréal (2018), Kansas Theory Workshop (2018), Tsinghua BEAT Workshop (2018), Norms, Actions, and Games Workshop in Toulouse (2016).

Scheduled Talks: Harvard-MIT, University of Pittsburgh, Royal Holloway University of London, University of Oxford, University College London, University of Warwick, University of Edinburgh, University of Manchester, Toulouse School of Economics, Contract Theory Workshop in Osaka.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor for Intermediate Microeconomics (310-2), Economic Theory and Methods (412-3), and Information Economics (414-3) at Northwestern University.

Instructor for Advanced Microeconomic Theory (Econ 520) at Yale University.

Invited guest lectures and minicourses on Repeated Games and Reputations at University of Oxford (Spring 2024), University of Pennsylvania (Spring 2023), Columbia University (Fall 2021), and Pennsylvania State University (Spring 2019).

Personal

US Permanent Resident.